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EQUALITIES REAL AND IDEAL:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN INDIAN LAW
COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN IN-
DIA. By Marc Galanter.' Berkeley: University of California Press.
1984. Pp. xxii, 625. $36.50.
Reviewed by Lance Liebman
2
American legal scholars have devoted surprisingly little effort to
studying India. In India, as in America, judges, lawyers, and legis-
lators have had to shape a transplanted legal system with English
roots. Both countries have adapted English legal institutions to con-
ditions far more heterogeneous - ethnically, racially, linguistically,
and geographically - than those of the mother country. It thus seems
no accident that India's constitutional structure parallels that of the
United States in so many ways. For example, India has a written
constitution that embodies principles of federalism and separation of
powers, and that provides for judicially enforced guarantees of indi-
vidual rights. 3 Indeed, nowhere else in the world does the judiciary
play so central a political role as it does in the United States and
India.
Yet the socialist political ideology that prevails in India today
conflicts with some of the Western, liberal values embodied in its legal
system. On the one hand, Indian courts dispense bourgeois justice in
a manner immediately familiar to the English or American observer.
The courts use English legal terminology and conduct their business
in English, a language understood by only a small fraction of the
population. Brilliantly garbed high-court judges are addressed as
"your lordship." More importantly, the courts are an effective re-
course only for individuals and businesses that can afford the costs of
access. On the other hand, modern India has formally dedicated itself
to socialist principles of government and to ending the hierarchies that
the legal system reflects and reinforces. 4 Thus, Indian law and society
I Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Mad-
ison.
2 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Senior Fulbright Lecturer, Maharajah Sayajirao
University of Baroda, India, 1984.
3 The Indian Constitution enumerates "Fundamental Rights," which are enforceable in court
and which include most of the personal protections assured by the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution. See INDIA CONST. pt. IIl. The Indian Constitution distinguishes these
rights from "Directive Principles of State Policy," which are constitutional exhortations to the
national and state parliaments. See INDIA CONST. pt. IV.
4 The preamble to India's Constitution states: "WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, have
solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMO-
CRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens JUSTICE... LIBERTY... EQUALITY
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at times move in conflicting directions. Their complicated interaction
and evolution illuminate the possibilities of preserving individual lib-
erty while achieving economic redistribution, of operating a Western
legal system under Asian conditions, and of maintaining an American-
style judicial role while giving the highest priority to coping with
poverty and social unrest.
The conflicts between Indian law and Indian political goals reflect
a deeper tension at the level of Indian identity. The Indian Consti-
tution and legal system stand for the significance of the individual in
a country dominated by group identifications. Western legal ideals
such as formal equality and equal treatment do not always square
with the Indian reality of deep ethnic and religious divisions. To
alleviate the effects of these divisions, India has instituted a broad
program of preferential treatment for its so-called "Backward
Classes," a program whose constitutionality was fiercely debated by
the Indian legislature and Supreme Court.5 Professor Marc Galanter,
the leading American expert on India's legal system, has published a
rich and balanced book on this system of what he calls "compensatory
discrimination."
' 6
Galanter is one of the very few American legal scholars to have
spent a considerable amount of time in India. 7 His extended stays in
India have made him well known among Indian judges and law
professors. Competing Equalities reflects Galanter's fluency with In-
dian law and society, his many years of research, and his painstaking
efforts to shape and distill unruly data. It is the most important work
yet written by an American about the Indian legal system, and it is
of status and of opportunity; and . . . FRATERNITY . . . ." The words "Socialist" and
"Secular" were added by constitutional amendment in 1976. See INDIA CONST. amend. 42, § 2.
s In 1950, pursuant to a national program designed to ensure educational opportunity for
the disadvantaged, the State of Madras apportioned seats in its medical and engineering colleges
on the basis of ethnic and religious characteristics, allotting only one-seventh of the available
places to upper-caste Brahmin students. A Brahmin student sued under Article 29(2) of the
Constitution, which provides that "[njo citizen shall be denied admission into any educational
institution maintained by the State . . . on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or
any of them." The Supreme Court held the system unconstitutional in State of Madras v.
Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 A.I.R. 226 (India). As Galanter notes (pp. 365-68), the govern-
ment amended the Constitution less than two months later to provide that "[n]othing in [Article
29(2)] . . . shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens .... " INDIA CONST. art. 25, cl.
4-
6 Galanter adopts the term self-consciously, recognizing that "names are not neutral" (pp. 2-
3). Indeed, compensation is not the only possible justification for or explanation of the preference
system. See infra pp. 1687-89.
7 Galanter is also an important scholar of United States law, working at the intersection of
social science and the legal system. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
32 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y R.v. 95 (1974).
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as good a general work about Indian law and the Indian Constitution
as can be found. 8
Competing Equalities is also a significant work of comparative
law. The book does make passing references to the ethnic preference
schemes of other countries, such as Israel's program benefiting Ori-
ental Jews and Japan's program favoring the Burakumin. More im-
portantly, however, the book takes a comparative approach in that
Galanter analyzes Indian law from the specific perspective of one
familiar with the legal history of black-white relationships in the
United States. Despite this foreign perspective, Galanter writes with
such deep sympathy for contemporary India that his study is likely to
receive serious attention in India as well as in the West.
I. COMPENSATORY DISCRIMINATION AND THE INDIAN COURTS
India's system of social classification and hierarchy, labeled a
"caste" system by early Portuguese colonists (p. 7 n.i), is thought by
some scholars to be an essential aspect of Hinduism, 9 the religion of
about two-thirds of the Indian population. Caste is the most impor-
tant communal identification of many Hindus. In contrast, India's
200 million non-Hindus - the Moslems, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, Bud-
dhists, and Christians - derive much of their identity from their
religious community. Perhaps no task assumed by India's political or
legal system is more important than peacefully keeping India's 700
million people united in one country and bringing them somehow into
one society.
Grappling with this task, India has pursued diverse and conflicting
goals. As a Hindu nation created by the partition of the subcontinent
in 1947, India is committed in some measure to traditional Hindu
values. India has also tried, however, to modernize those values.
Gandhiism, the political foundation of independent India, is rooted in
Hindu piety and yet repudiates the hierarchies of caste (and also of
sex) that are arguably fundamental to Hinduism. Much of India's
governmental structure and economic policy is an attempt to imple-
ment under Asian conditions the Fabian socialism that the nation's
founders learned at English universities. The broad program of pref-
erential treatment in favor of the disadvantaged, pursued primarily
in the areas of legislative representation, government jobs, and edu-
cation, has drawn on all of these sources and is at the heart of India's
effort to maintain unity in the face of manifold division.
8 The only criticism the book deserves is that it may have been in the pipeline too long
without being revised to reflect events of the I98os. For example, excerpts from the Indian
Constitution included in an appendix (pp. 570-74) are io years out of date.
9 See M. WEBER, THE RELIGION OF INDIA: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM
29 (H. Gerth & D. Martindale trans. I958); Marriott & Inden, Caste Systems, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 982, 985 (Ith ed. I975).
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To facilitate the representation of disadvantaged groups, the Indian
Constitution provides that in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the
national legislature, seats are "reserved" for "Scheduled Castes" in
proportion to their numbers in India as a whole; in 1976, this provision
resulted in the reservation of 14.4% of the seats (pp. 44-45). "Sched-
uled Castes" is the constitutional euphemism for those whom the
English first called "untouchables" (p. 25 n.21), a group whose con-
tours have never been precisely defined. 10 In addition, the Constitu-
tion reserves a proportional number of seats, 7% in 1976, for "Sched-
uled Tribes" (pp. 44-45), groups that are more or less outside the
caste system and are characterized by "tribal origin, [a] primitive way
of life [and] remote habitation" (p. 152). Seats are reserved in a similar
manner in state legislatures. Deciding which of the thousands of
groups in the complex Indian mosaic are "Scheduled Castes" or
"Tribes" is accomplished by means of an official decisionmaking pro-
cess.
Certain features of the legislative reservations seem remarkable to
an American. In the United States, the combination of a dispersed
black population and a single-member-district system leads to black
representation in Congress and in state legislatures that is always
substantially smaller than the percentage of the population that is
black. Our constitutional jurisprudence has wrestled with whether
voting districts can be redrawn in ways designed to create black
electoral majorities." In contrast, India's system, while allowing all
adults to vote, permits only Scheduled Caste members to be candidates
in Scheduled Caste districts (p. 45). 12 Because members of the Sched-
uled Castes are dispersed throughout the country, seats are reserved
for them in districts with populations overwhelmingly made up of
persons not belonging to the Scheduled Castes. Tribal peoples, in
contrast, are more likely to occupy geographically distinct areas, and
thus seats are reserved for members of the Scheduled Tribes in areas
with significant tribal populations.
According to Galanter, the Scheduled Caste and Tribe represen-
tatives are "widely believed" to be "less articulate, less assertive, and
10 According to Galanter, "The selection [of Scheduled Castes] has proceeded primarily on
the basis of 'untouchability' - measured by the incidence of social disabilities - but this
criterion has been combined in varying degrees with economic, occupational, educational, and
... residential and religious tests" (p. 134). Galander notes that "untouchability" itself "had
no technical legal meaning before the Constitution abolished it" (p. I45).
11 See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)
(holding that New York's use of racial criteria in revising its reapportionment plan to establish
black majority voting districts did not violate the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments).
12 This system may have made more sense when most districts elected two members of the
Lok Sabha. Most designated Scheduled Caste districts elected one Scheduled Caste member
and one nonrestricted member. Now, however, all constituencies elect one member (pp. 46-47
n.26). Galanter refers to a "massive withdrawal by voters" from participation in the reserved
seat elections (p. 549).
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less independent than their fellows" (p. 52). He cites data suggesting
that they have been relatively less "active" and "influential" and that
they are less likely to hold leadership positions (p. 52). Traditionally,
however, at least one Scheduled Caste representative serves in the
national cabinet. Even if these representatives are generally less ac-
tive, they may nonetheless effectively represent the interests of their
constituents. Galanter notes that holders of the reserved seats seem
to "have been prominent and sometimes influential" in matters relating
to the welfare of the groups they represent (p. 53).
Government employment, another area addressed by the prefer-
ential treatment program, is of extreme importance in India, a country
where such jobs carry security, pay, and dignity hard to match in the
private sector. The law reserves a substantial percentage of these
jobs: in 1970, "of posts recruited directly on an all-India basis by open
competitive examination," 15% were reserved for Scheduled Castes
and 7.5% for Scheduled Tribes (p. 86). Unlike legislative reservations,
which are set aside only for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, however,
preferences in government employment and educational admissions
were extended early on to all of the "Backward Classes" - disadvan-
taged groups identified on the basis of economic and social criteria in
addition to caste. 13 Beneficiaries of this program obtain government
jobs with test scores significantly below those of other applicants,
although Galanter suggests that critics have overstated the extent to
which this situation in fact arises (pp. 111-13). Galanter indicates
that the job reservation program has substantially improved the eco-
nomic situation of its beneficiaries, at least those in the Scheduled
Castes. Perhaps 6% of the Scheduled Caste families in India have a
family member who has obtained a government job on this basis (p.
io8). 14 The program does not apply to private sector employment (p.
103), even though government involvement in the "private" economy
is far more extensive in India than in the United States.
Since independence, there has been a vast expansion of the Indian
educational system (p. 58), the third area targeted by the program of
preferential treatment. The Indian government refers to education as
13 Chapter 6 of Galanter's book discusses the many meanings given to the term "Backward
Classes" in different parts of India at different times under different official programs. A "rough
equivalent" for Backward Classes is "weaker sections" (p. 3). The earliest use of the term may
have been in i88o as a description of "a list of groups, also called illiterate or indigent classes,
entitled to allowances for study in elementary schools" (p. 154 n.i). In 1921, the State of Mysore
instituted a preferential recruitment program providing government jobs to members of "back-
ward communities," which were defined as "all communities other than Brahmins, who are not
now adequately represented in the public service" (p. s56). More recently, India's courts have
insisted that factors other than caste be taken into account in defining the Backward Classes.
See infra pp. 1689-go.
14 Galanter observes that "reservations succeed, where exhortation and good will do not, in
getting members of the beneficiary groups into government service" (p. 1o5).
1985] 1683
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
a great equalizer of opportunity (p. 58 n.65), and, as in many under-
developed countries, student status is coveted. With a broad program
of fee waivers, scholarships, reservations of places at professional
schools, and some lowering of admission standards at these schools,
India has attempted to include the disadvantaged throughout its edu-
cational system (pp. 59-64). As with the employment preference pro-
gram, the program of educational preferences was extended almost
from its inception to cover not only the Scheduled Castes and Tribes,
but also India's Backward Classes in general (pp. 62-64). Although
Galanter calls the program's accomplishments "stunning" in relation
to pre-independence conditions (p. 61), he also notes that the current
proportion of India's disadvantaged who receive education - even
primary education - remains quite small (pp. 58-59, 6i).15 In ad-
dition, the drop-out rate of members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes
from universities has been "staggeringly high" (p. 63), although stu-
dents from Backward Classes other than the Scheduled groups appear
to be having greater success (p. 63).
The problems encountered by members of Scheduled Castes and
Tribes at universities are of course at least partly due, as Galanter
points out, to the inferior schooling they receive at the intermediate
levels (pp. 6i, 63). One cannot help wondering, however, whether
these students' immersion into an environment dominated by the
higher castes does not also contribute to their difficulties. The visitor
to Indian universities often hears high-caste professors speak dispar-
agingly about the qualifications of low-caste students and about the
effect of their admission on the quality of the university. When that
visitor is an American professor, he sees immediate parallels to the
attitudes of some American teachers and students toward beneficiaries
of affirmative action admissions and hiring programs; he also sees in
India parallels to the debates in the United States about whether
minority 16 and female students learn more in integrated or in segre-
gated classrooms.
Galanter's book is chiefly an analysis of reported judicial decisions
about the compensatory discrimination system. Some of the litigation
concerns the inevitable implementation problems in so complex a
scheme of classification. These problems include the status of political
candidates who have moved from states where they were classed as
members of a Scheduled group to states where they are not (pp. 139-
43), the preference ramifications of government service promotional
Is Galanter's statistics, unfortunately somewhat dated, indicate that in ig6I less than io%
of the members of Scheduled groups were literate (pp. 58-59) and that fewer than 20,ooo had
graduated from college, at a time when India had a total of 1,147,000 college graduates (p. 61
n.87).
16 See, e.g., St. John, The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: A New Look at the
Research Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84-103 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman
& C. Schelling eds. 198i).
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examinations (pp. 100-02), and the consequences of religious conver-
sion (pp. 327-31). In other instances, judicial decisions have gone to
the very core of the compensatory program, as is dramatically evi-
denced by the cases concerning group eligibility under the expanding
category of the Backward Classes (pp. 222-81).
Political leaders have argued that millions of Indians who rank
above "untouchables" nonetheless suffer from past economic and social
deprivation and need assistance to adapt to the modern society India
seeks to create. The recognition of the need for preferences for certain
groups has led others, most of whom could plausibly assert a need
for help, to campaign for inclusion. The preference system thus be-
came embroiled in politics, and in the late 1970s legislatures added
several groups to the list of designees (p. 187). The judiciary took an
important step toward limiting the preference system when it stated
in Balaji v. State of Mysore17 that the Indian Constitution did not
permit preferences to be granted to as many as 50% of a state's
population.' 8 In addition, courts have required minimal "merit" qual-
ifications for government employment and for university admissions
(pp. 420-25).19 In most states today, preferences benefit between 25%
and 50% of the population.
Galanter persuasively argues that the intersection of democratic
politics and the award of job and educational preferences to well-
established groups inherently entails some aspects of a spoils system.
Politicians trade government jobs for the votes of ethnic communities
in ways that seem familiar to those who have observed big-city politics
in the United States. The Indian courts have demanded that the
legislatures choose to benefit groups that are in fact more deprived
than those not chosen. They have thus supervised the legislature's
distribution of employment preferences in much the same way that
American civil service commissions oversee the allocation of jobs by
municipal politicians.
At the same time, judicial review has brought into the open the
entire process - including the role played by the judiciary itself.
India and the United States are two of the very few countries in the
world in which major political struggles can be chronicled through
written court decisions. 20 The Indian political system has been re-
markably tolerant of this judicial role. The preference system is an
17 x963 A.I.R. 649 (India).
18 See id. at 663; see also Ramakrishna Singh v. State of Mysore, i96o A.I.R. 338, 349
(Mysore) (holding invalid a scheme on the ground that designation of 95% of the population as
Backward Classes was "a fraud on the Constitution").
19 See, e.g., Dilip Kumar v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1973 A.I.R. 592 (Allahabad).
20 Galanter notes that Indian courts have increasingly looked to American precedents in
interpreting constitutional provisions and that, in particular, Indian lawyers and judges have




ongoing subject of debate in the press and has even occasioned riots
(p. 4o n.65). Yet Galanter shows that the courts have occupied the
vast area within the preference system in which rules need to be
prescribed and fundamental policy choices need to be made, and he
demonstrates that on the whole their decisions have been imple-
mented. The judiciary, commanding more trust and respect than
other elements of the Indian government, has thus played an essential
role in the operation of the compensatory discrimination system, at
little cost to its general legitimacy.
21
Competing Equalities affords a close and revealing perspective on
the Indian judiciary's efforts to accomplish this task. One broad
conclusion that emerges from the preference litigation is that the courts
have not on the whole been able to systematize the law. Courts
"address the exigencies of different factual situations and have to apply
doctrine which they have encountered infrequently" (p. 539). In other
words, judges have sought fair solutions to a series of individual cases,
but have provided few generalizations that have proved useful in
deciding later cases.
22
Indian judges address the specifics of their country's complex social
conditions with what seems to the Western observer to be almost too
little trepidation. The questions that arise in these cases cannot be
resolved by logic or by reference to social science literature; instead,
they require judgment based on a knowledge of the intimate details
of caste experience. 23 Courts have sometimes treated such social
"facts" as matters to be established in the trial record. More often,
judges write as if they "know" how the caste system works or what
it means to convert to a different religion. Their opinions are full of
off-the-cuff statements about Indian society, religions, ideas, and be-
havior. The Supreme Court seems to give little weight to the decisions
of state courts (pp. 495-97), even though religious and caste practices
vary so widely throughout the country that local courts might have
greater knowledge in these matters.
21 Galanter suggests that the courts legitimate the compensatory discrimination system by
limiting the scope of its application (p. 545).
22 "[I]n India 'new [doctrinal] ideas are added without old ideas being discarded. . . .[Liaw
does not evolve in the Supreme Court [of India], it meanders'" (p. 540) (quoting R. DHAVAN,
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: A Socio-LEGAL CRITIQUE OF ITS JURISTIC TECHNIQUES 451-
52 (977)). Galanter concludes:
[B]oth formalism and incoherence are built into the structure of the situation. A concep-
tualistic intellectual tradition combines with imponderable questions and limited fact-
finding capacities to produce overgeneral rules. Heavy work loads, sitting in small and
shifting benches, lack of expertise on the part of advocates, and a lack of drive for
synthesis lead to the elaboration of various inconsistent strands of authority. The two
tendencies are mutually reinforcing: the plurality of rules adds to overload and ambiguity,
which is temporarily resolved by further rule elaboration. (P. 540).
23 Judges must decide, for example, whether an individual experiences "loss of caste" by
changing his or her religion from Hinduism to Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism (pp, 315-16).
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In the United States, the question of judicial capacity to interpret
social science evidence in making decisions about the experience of
minorities was explicitly confronted in the debate triggered by the
famous footnote eleven in Brown v. Board of Education.24 More
recently, Chief Justice Burger's attempt to ground affirmative action
in employment on homey insights about social reality has provoked
criticism from some social scientists. 25 Nonetheless, implementation
of racial and ethnic categorizations in this country has not required
judges to classify individuals and groups to anything like the extent
called for by the Indian system.
The reader of Indian opinions is often left with the impression that
although the opinions consist of serious and intelligent observations
based on the experience individual judges have had within Indian
society, they mainly express the views of relatively affluent, high-
caste, urban, and westernized Indians about groups with which they
lack direct experience. 26 It is surprising that Galanter, a sociologist,
does not make more than he does of what passes in judicial opinions
for knowledge of castes, tribes, and "backwardness." Although he
occasionally raises interesting questions about the "facts" or assump-
tions that judges employ, he does not attempt a comprehensive dis-
cussion of how these "social facts" affect the jurisprudence of prefer-
ence systems.
11. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF COMPENSATORY DISCRIMINATION
Competing Equalities is also about the practical and conceptual
difficulties arising from India's compensatory discrimination program.
Tensions and contradictions emerge in the judicial implementation of
India's program, tensions and contradictions that may be relevant to
our own efforts to overcome a history of caste-like discrimination.
One set of problems involves the familiar claim that particular
beneficiaries of preference programs have not been deserving. It is
the best off among the preferred groups who obtain government jobs
and admission to universities (pp. 468-69). These individuals, how-
24 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.i (i954) (citing social science works
to support the proposition that mandated segregation has negative effects on black schoolchil-
dren); see also J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
84--99, io6 (i985) (discussing the controversy surrounding the footnote). Chief Justice Warren
later said: "It was only a note, after all." See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 7o6 (1976).
25 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-33 (1971). For criticism of the Griggs
approach by social scientists, see Report of the Committee on Ability Testing, Assembly of
Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council, in ABILITY TESTING: USES, CON-
SEQUENCES AND CONTROVERSIES (A. Wigdor & W. Garner eds. 1982).




ever, are said to be underqualified for the positions made available to
them. Many in the higher status groups feel that injustices are being
done to them and to their children (pp. IO9-Io, 549) and that India
is suffering because substantially fewer qualified persons receive edu-
cational opportunities and government jobs (p. i i i).
These objections challenge the preference programs at the level of
individual desert and compensation. But affording opportunities to
individuals who have been victims of discrimination and who could
perform well if freed of social handicaps is not the only possible
justification for affirmative action. India seeks to grant university
admission and government jobs to persons of low caste in part to
distribute society's rewards more equitably among groups in the pop-
ulation, in part to support leadership cadres within low-caste com-
munities, in part to create visible symbols and role models for young
people of low caste, and in part to give all segments of the population
the experience of studying and working in multicaste environments.
At least some of these goals can be achieved even if the individuals
who receive assistance are not particularly needy or even particularly
effective at their jobs.
Yet recognizing that preference programs can have many justifi-
cations increases the difficulty of deciding which groups should be
selected as beneficiaries. The legislative reservations, for example,
stand for the proposition that groups with no political power in the
past should be given a significant role in making the nation's laws.
The Scheduled Castes and Tribes, however, are by no means the only
groups that, under this justification, require assured representation.
Indeed, under British rule, the Government of India Act of i919
assured representation for Moslems, Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians,
and Aborigines, as well as for the so-called "Depressed Classes" (p.
363 n.i).
One reason for the reservation of legislative seats for Scheduled
Castes, but not for disadvantaged non-Hindu groups, 27 was a desire
among the founders of independent India to create a nation that held
most of its population within the ambit of Hinduism. 28 This concern
27 A presidential order of 1950 stated: "'[N]o person professing a religion different from
Hinduism shall be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste'" (p. 144). Galanter writes:
The religious test for Scheduled Castes is employed, not as a positive test for selecting
appropriate groups for inclusion, but as a disqualification of individuals and groups who
otherwise meet the criteria, thereby inevitably discouraging conversion. There is reason
to think that this was at least part of its purpose. (P. 144) (footnote omitted).
28 Different reasons explain the grant of legislative reservations to Scheduled Tribes. For
the Scheduled Castes, "it is hoped that the disabilities and disadvantages that separate them
from their compatriots will eventually be overcome by the preferential treatment" (p. 153). For
the Tribes, however, defined in 1965 by the government-appointed Lokur Committee as those
with "'primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographic isolation, shyness of contact with the
community at large and backwardness,'" the national policy is "preservation of their separate
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was evidenced by the success of Dr. Ambedkar, a leader of "untouch-
ables" earlier in this century, in extracting constitutional concessions
for his constituents by threatening a mass conversion of "untoucha-
bles" to Buddhism (p. 326 n. 191). The reservation system today still
denies protection to "untouchables" who convert to another religion
(pp. 143-44).29 A consequence is that poor and low-status members
of religions other than Hinduism, especially Muslims, many of whom
are descended from persons who converted from Hinduism to escape
untouchability, remain unaided, if they are not in fact disadvantaged,
by the compensation program.
The same issues of limiting group eligibility along religious and
caste lines have surfaced in the areas of job and educational prefer-
ences. Here the courts have been instrumental in insisting on other
criteria for limiting eligibility. The Supreme Court, in the landmark
Balaji case, held that caste alone could not be the basis for designating
a preferred Backward Class (p. 191).30 In another case, the Supreme
Court ruled that a Backward Class could be defined in terms of
income and occupation alone, without reference to caste (p. 233).31
More recently, the Court upheld a caste-based sytem that took "suf-
ficient" account of social and educational criteria (p. 238).32
These judicial acts of group categorization are problematic not
only because the criteria used are controversial, but also because any
criteria are necessarily inadequate. Contemporary scholarship sug-
gests that Indian society was never as immobile as the conventional
Western interpretation suggests (p. 349). Whether or not this schol-
arship is accurate, it is certainly true that people in modern India
move, marry outside their group, adopt outsiders, and change occu-
pations. An individual may therefore participate in a complex pattern
of group affiliations. Litigation, however, has forced judges to impose
categories on the ambiguous and fluid reality of Indian society. Courts
declare that some groups are "backward" whereas others are not, and
they decide which group designation is appropriate for an individual
whose life straddles different communities. Galanter describes this
integrity, rather than complete assimilation. ... to balance improvement of their condition and
a degree of assimilation with preservation of their distinctiveness and a measure of autonomy"
(pp. 152-53).
29 One exception to this rule is that the law now deems certain Sikhs to be Scheduled Caste
members (p. 144), even though the Sikh religion denies the existence of castes.
30 See Balaji v. State of Mysore, 1963 A.I.R. 649, 658-60 (India).
31 See Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, 1964 A.I.R. 1823, 1826 (India).
32 See State of Andhra Pradesh v. Balaram, 1972 A.I.R. 1375, 1396 (India). Of course,
deciding whom to favor in a country with so many who are poor is a difficult task. The answer
of the Indian legislators and judges has been that the criterion of poverty cannot be ignored,
but it cannot be sufficient alone. There must also be "shared attitudes and dispositions that
render it unlikely that members of a group will, without special help, take advantage of
opportunites to improve their position" (p. 239).
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process of judicial classification as the development of "authoritative
official learning on the question of group identity" (p. 564) and views
India's experience with ethnic classification as "a relatively benign
jurisprudence of group identity" (p. 564). But he is struck by "the
irony of employing group identity in the service of reducing disparities
among groups" (p. 564) and worries that the system may "gravitate
into a comprehensive system of group allotments" (p. 567).
On the issue of group categorization, Galanter makes his major
policy recommendation to Indian legislators and judges. Writing as
a sympathetic social scientist, he recommends replacement of simple
categories with a multidimensional selection process that "give[s] rec-
ognition to the areas of blurring and overlap that are found within"
the Indian caste system (p. 348). He advocates a system that "is
congenial to multiple and overlapping affiliations ... [and] address[es]
itself to whether, in the light of the policy of the particular legislation
involved, the individual can be said to be a member of the group
concerned" (p. 348). Galanter wants judges to encourage the prefer-
ence system to use a greater variety of criteria so that the selection of
those to be benefited can take account of a broad and sophisticated
range of socially relevant characteristics. And yet, as he acknowl-
edges, the system requires clerks to implement millions of individual
determinations. Great sophistication in choosing among the truly
needy is probably impossible and certainly cannot be successfully
mandated by judges.33 Furthermore, a very complicated system with
a great deal of discretion will tend to benefit those who can understand
and manipulate the system rather than those who are most "deserving"
(p. 472).
Finally, the judicial categorization of the populace poses a problem
not merely at the level of Indians' personal identities, but also at that
of India's national identity - a problem challenging the very ideal of
equality. On the one hand, the Indian Constitution seeks to abolish
castes, committing itself to equality34 and establishing equal treatment
for all Indian citizens.3 5 On the other hand, the constitutional pro-
visions permitting preferential treatment of members of the Backward
Classes3 6 are exceptions to the ideals of formal equality and equal
treatment, and preference schemes give official recognition to caste
identities.
33 The difficulties that courts have encountered supervising the selection process are exem-
plified in a series of cases from the State of Jammu and Kashmir that Galanter discusses (pp.
450-55). The judges held that a particular group was not sufficiently "backward" to be eligible
for the extra points they were receiving on examinations for government jobs. The bureaucrats
switched from tests to interviews and thereby managed to pick people from the group they
wanted.
34 See supra note 4.
35 See, e.g., INDIA CONST. arts. I5(1), 16(2), 29(2).
36 See supra note 5.
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India must indeed grapple with "competing equalities": an ideal
of equality, transplanted perhaps from Western constitutional history,
coexists uneasily with the reality of India's deeply divided society.
Nehru, speaking as Prime Minister, put the conflict thus: "[W]e arrive
at a peculiar tangle. We cannot have equality because in trying to
attain equality we come up against some principles of equality" (p.
379).37 The United States, of course, confronts a similar challenge as
it struggles to find a third stage of civil rights policies. First anti-
discrimination edicts and then affirmative action contributed to sig-
nificant educational and employment gains for blacks. Yet it appears
that these policies will provide little assistance to a substantial segment
of the black community and that large disparities between the aggre-
gate positions of blacks and whites will persist into the indefinite
future. Meanwhile, affirmative action policies are on the defensive
under the Reagan administration and in the courts. In the United
States, as in India, "equality" means no single thing and policies aimed
at achieving equality conform to no consistent theory.
Despite the formidable difficulties posed by the conundrum of
fighting for equality with legally mandated inequality, Professor Gal-
anter concludes that India has found a workable approach:
India has managed to pursue a commitment to substantive justice
without allowing that commitment to dissolve competing commitments
to formal equality that make law viable in a diverse society with
limited consensus. The Indian experience displays a principled eclec-
ticism that avoids suppressing the altruistic fraternal impulse that
animates compensatory policies, but that also avoids being enslaved
by it. (P. 567).
III. CONCLUSION
Ever the careful social scientist and cautious lawyer, Professor
Galanter maintains that his years of work on this subject have led
him to "no single big lesson" (p. 563). He is certain that the system
of compensatory discrimination, "more congenial in practice than in
theory" (p. 567), has achieved gains for India that outweigh its con-
ceptual difficulties. He catalogues the losses as well as the gains that
flow to individuals and groups designated Scheduled or Backward
(PP. 551-52). Other Indians, for example, see the members of these
groups as of dubious competence, having achieved their positions only
through the preference system (p. 98). But Galanter also recognizes
that in the Indian context the system represents both a denial of any
hope of immediately achieving a society of homogeneous individuals
37 The early amenders of India's Constitution obviously saw the contradiction and provided
only for a io-year system of reservations. But in each decade since, the Constitution has been
further amended to extend the system for an additional io years (p. 46).
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(p. 561) and an acceptance of pluralism in a society that survives by
appearing minimally fair to enough groups. India may be purchasing
short-term gains at the expense of substantial longer-term costs to its
own goals and ideals. In particular, by helping to consolidate the
power of leaders who serve as brokers for narrow communal groups,
India may be making it less likely that the country will ever surmount
its group tensions.
American sociologists, rejecting simplistic "melting pot" predic-
tions, no longer expect Americans to forget their ethnic origins and
identities. Rather, they hope that families will take pride in their dif-
ferences and "mediate" their relations with the larger society through
identifications that are very likely to be racial, ethnic, and national.38
The question for Americans is to what extent government should give
official sanction to such identifications and distribute benefits and
rewards according to ethnic quotas. Many have argued that the
inevitable result of reliance on ethnic quotas will be group tensions
and perceptions of unfairness resulting from the process and damage
to the legitimacy of the system that distributes jobs and educational
opportunities. Galanter demonstrates that a more populated and com-
plicated country than the United States has used such a system for
thirty-five years, and that the system, despite presenting social risks,
has achieved real gains for those formerly deprived.
Hierarchy has survived in India, but so have democratic politics,
a legal system with high aspirations, and much wider civil liberties
than exist in most developing countries. Although India still faces
great problems, the country has so far escaped both tyranny and
revolution. Compensatory discrimination has contributed to the sur-
vival of independent India.
38 See, e.g., N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (x963); N. Glazer,
The Peoples of America, in ETHNIC DILEMMAS: 1964-1982, at 17 (1983).
Galanter expresses a similar vision of India's possible development:
If secularism is defined in terms of the elimination of India's compartmental group
structure in favor of a compact and unitary society, then the compensatory discrimination
policy may indeed have impeded secularism. But one may instead visualize not the
disappearance of communal groups but their transformation into components of a plur-
alistic society in which invidious hierarchy is discarded while diversity is accommodated.
In this view compensatory discrimination policy contributes to secularism by reducing
group disparities and blunting hierarchic distinctions. (P. 561).
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